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Virtuous Soldiers: A Role for the Liberal Arts? 
 
“You cannot make men good by law” 
 C.S. Lewis, Mere Christianity 
 
Introduction 
 
Ethical discussions of war tend to centre around two distinct, but related, areas. The first area 
involves discussions about what can and cannot - as a matter of principle - be done in the lead up to, 
execution of and resolution of war. These set of ideas are commonly called just war theory (JWT)1 the 
discussion of when and how military force might be used in a way that comports with broader ideas 
of justice. The second, less popular area discusses the moral lives and character of those participating 
in war, and examines the various ways in which a person's character can affect the way that they 
conduct themselves at war, and vice versa.2 The former category will be referred to as the 
deontological aspect of JWT; the latter as the aretaic aspect.3   
Although deontological and aretaic aspects of JWT are conceptually related, their relation 
within the academic literature has often been similar to that of estranged brothers: there is a formal 
relationship between the two, but the occasions on which the two actually come together are 
extremely rare; and when they do, there is a good chance that things will get messy. Integrating the 
deontological and aretaic aspects of JWT is a project few have embarked on, and even fewer have 
done so well. 
It is somewhat surprising that this is the case, because a review of the history of JWT reveals 
that the original architects of the theory (at least as it is understood in the modern day) viewed an 
important role for questions of virtue, character, moral psychology and intention within JWT, not just 
as a thematically related moral question, but as a central aspect of the theory itself. For the fathers of 
JWT, one could not distinguish the deontological from the aretaic: both were intrinsic and necessary 
elements of a complete and coherent morality of war. 
Over time, however, attempts to develop JWT into a set of codified principles (which would 
form the basis of international law) led to a growing interest in the deeds which were permissible and 
impermissible and a diminishing concern regarding the moral character of the agents performing the 
deeds; that is, a growing focus on the deontological at the expense of the aretaic. For instance, Hugo 
Grotius, perhaps the most substantial contributor to this codification project, distinguished between 
that which the law of nations permitted, viz. that which one could not be punished for doing, and that 
which it was morally right or virtuous to do. 
 
When I first set out to explain this part of the law of nations I bore witness that many things 
are said to be 'lawful' or 'permissible' for the reason that they are done with impunity [...] 
things which, nevertheless, either deviate from the rule of right [...] or at any rate may be 
omitted on higher grounds and with greater praise among good men (Grotius 2006: Bk. III, 
X.I). 
 
Grotius demonstrates his point with reference to Seneca's Trojan Women, where Phyrrus claims that 
no law protects captives from any form of injury, to which Agamemnon responds ‘[w]hat law 
permits, this sense of shame forbids’ (Grotius 2006: Bk. III, X.I). This ‘sense of shame’ is a recognition 
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of what Grotius calls ‘internal justice’: the moral laws that govern warfare, and forbid what the law of 
nations may permit (Grotius 2006: Bk. III, XI.II). Thus, although commentators who have suggested 
that Grotius ‘straddles the gap between morality and the law,’ (Orend 2007: 17) the emphasis is, in 
many ways, on the gap between the two rather than any continuity between them. The law is 
preferred because of the readiness with which it can be taught, enforced, and punished. In the words 
of Endre Bebgy, Gregory Reichberg & Henrik Syse (2012: 320), Grotius (and Vitoria and Suarez before 
him) preferred the deontological aspects of JWT for their ‘juridical connotations.’ Unethical 
behaviour, by contrast, is often difficult to prove in legal contexts, which explains why right intention, 
which ‘looks to the inner moral quality of an agent’s action […] is hardly invoked by Vitoria or 
Suarez’ (Begby, Reichberg, & Syse 2012: 320). When it is invoked by Grotius, it is limited to a question 
of private morality rather than part of the universally applicable laws of war. Over time, as 
international law became more influential, this focus shift in the thinking of just-war-theorists-cum-
international-lawyers like Grotius became entrenched in legal, academic, and military thinking, 
leading to JWT being ‘displaced from the centre of normative reflection on international affairs’ 
(Begby, Reichberg, & Syse 2012: 323). As Jeff McMahan (2009: 106) explains, 
 
As the legal regulation of war became more effective, particularly in the eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries, the practical significance of just war theory was gradually eclipsed by 
that of the evolving law of war. 
 
In no place was this more true than with regard to aretaic aspects of JWT; after all, at first sight the 
private character of soldiers and political leaders, the private intentions of actors, and the 
instantiation of habits appear to have far less juridical relevance than do questions of (for example) 
rights violations, sovereignty, and legitimate authority. Consequently, many of today’s accounts of 
JWT focus almost exclusively on prescribing what a soldier, officer, general, politician or even civilian 
should do in any particular situation. This usually takes a deontological form, describing various 
duties or principles that must be upheld (the most obvious examples are the jus in bello principles of 
proportionality and discrimination). Typically, the lens through which these duties and principles are 
usually developed and reconciled is human rights. The idea being that a war which the nation has a 
right to wage, and in which all agents perform only actions they have a right to perform (that is, a war 
in which nobody is wronged), will be an entirely just war.  
The more recent iterations of JWT tend, therefore, to focus on the moral character of certain 
actions (just, unjust, illegal, rights-violating, etc.) as opposed to the character of the agents performing 
those actions. The general project has been to describe just wars in terms of the actions that will (or 
will not) constitute them. However, close examination of older thinking within the just war tradition 
reveals some shortcomings in this approach: shortcomings that derive from the absence of aretaic 
thinking in contemporary JWT. First, they fail to recognise how even prima facie just actions can have 
deleterious effects on the character of an individual, and therefore are of grave moral significance. 
Secondly, deontologically-focussed instantiations of JWT fail to appropriately consider the continuity 
between act and actor: the instantiation of good deeds is greatly expedited by, if not entirely 
dependent on, the moral virtue of the person performing the deed.  
In what follows I will first demonstrate how and why virtue was seen to be an integral part of 
some of the original just war theories, and how these theories conceived of the virtuous soldier. This 
approach will be contrasted with the conception of the virtuous soldier that seems to emerge from 
deontologically-focussed just war theories. Following this, I will argue that it is the more dated, 
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classical conception of JWT and of the virtuous soldier that best comports with recent trends within 
military ethics education (MEE) which are beginning to emphasise the development of the moral 
character and virtue of their soldiers (especially officers).4 Finally, whilst supporting these recent 
trends, I will suggest some ways in which the classic model of liberal arts education might 
supplement and support this virtue-based approach to MEE. 
 
1: The Flight from Virtue in JWT 
 
The first part of this section will describe classical JWT, viewed through the works of two of its 
fathers: St. Augustine of Hippo and St. Thomas Aquinas. These thinkers have been chosen because of 
they reside relatively early in the history of JWT, and also demonstrate particular interest in aretaic 
matters. Despite the presence of other significant contributors to classical JWT, I choose these two 
because they are unquestionably two of the most influential figures of the early development of JWT. 
Furthermore, because (as I have already noted) post-Aquinas, JWT begins to move in the modern 
direction thanks to the contributions of Francisco Vitoria and Hugo Grotius, aretaic discussions are 
best preserved in these two thinkers. It is in Augustine and Aquinas that we see the origins of virtue-
based JWT in its most pure form, serving as an excellent comparison to modern-day, deontological 
theories (described in the second section). 
 
1.1: Classical JWT 
St. Augustine, often credited as being the father of JWT (Kinsella & Carr 2007; 55, Orend 2007: 12, 
Steinhoff 2007: 9, Holmes 1989: 115-116), believed that the soul was the seat of virtue, and that 
therefore what was most significant in moral evaluations were the internal states of agents, including 
those involved in waging war.  
 
What is the evil in war? Is it the death of some who will soon die in any case, that others may live 
in peaceful subjection? This is mere cowardly dislike, not any religious feeling. The 
real evils in war are love of violence, revengeful cruelty, fierce and implacable enmity, wild 
resistance, and the lust of power, and such like (Augustine 1887: 22.77). 
 
Augustine further emphasizes the importance of internal states by arguing that justice in war requires 
that human beings must fight with a spirit of reluctance and sobriety, not hatred or enmity:  
 
[f]or it is the injustice of the opposing side that lays on the wise man the duty of waging wars; 
and this injustice is assuredly to be deplored by human beings [...] And yet a man who 
experiences such evils, or even thinks about them, without heartfelt grief, is assuredly in a far 
more pitiable condition, if he thinks himself happy simply because he has lost all human feeling 
(Augustine [1467] (1972): 19.7).  
 
In the thirteenth century another theologian, St. Thomas Aquinas, revived St. Augustine’s just war 
thinking. When Aquinas examined war, he situated the discussion within in a broader discussion of 
the virtues, arguing it to be a vice against charity. It is a vice insofar as it acts against peace, which is 
one of three 'effects' of charity. However, where war aims to restore a peace that is already broken, it 
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may be just; on the other hand, where war acts against peace, it is unjust (Aquinas 1948: II-II q. 40 a. 1).  
Ultimately though, all JWs are regulated by the virtue of charity.5 
Charity, for Aquinas, is the virtue of love between persons which is based on a love for God 
(Aquinas 1948: II-II q. 23 a. 1). However, charity is not just one of many virtues, but is what Thomas 
calls a ‘special virtue’ (II-II q. 23 a. 4), meaning that it is a virtue that relates directly to a particular 
'species' of love (Divine love), and therefore no true virtue is possible without charity (II-II q. 23 a. 7). 
This leads Aquinas to call charity ‘the form of the virtues’ because it directs man to his ultimate end, 
God (II-II q. 23 a. 8). Peace is one of the 'special attitudes' of charity; Aquinas calls it one of the effects 
of charity (II-II q. 29 a. 3). For Aquinas, peace entails two separate things: first, concord: the wills of 
various hearts agreeing together in consenting to the same thing; and second, what might be called 
inner peace: a harmony amongst one’s own feelings, desires, and moral judgements. 
It is at this point that Aquinas defends certain wars as just insofar as their striving toward or 
defending peace is consistent with the virtue of charity. The argument is fairly intuitive: if peace is an 
aspect of the good life, one can be justified in defending that peace under certain conditions. The 
conditions listed by Aquinas have been enshrined in JWT as the jus ad bellum conditions of just cause, 
right intention, and legitimate authority. However, for many, Aquinas’ significance as a just war 
theorist ends with these contributions. Some go a step further, exploring Aquinas’ notions of 
intentionality and the doctrine of double-effect,6 but very few take the time to consider Aquinas’ 
treatment of aretaic questions later in his Summa Theologica. His treatment is most specifically directed 
to in bello concerns, at which stage Aquinas considers in detail the virtues that bear most directly on 
those who fight in wars. Here Aquinas subjects in bello moral requirements to aretaic considerations, 
seeing the internal character of military personnel as being just as important as the moral character of 
the acts they perform. 
The inclusion of virtues amongst Aquinas’ writing on war is significant not only because it 
reflects a conception of JWT in which the virtues of individual agents are considered prevalent, but 
also because of the connection between the virtues and happiness in Aquinas’ writing. For Aquinas, 
‘happiness […] consists in an operation of virtue,’ (I-II q. 4 a. 7) meaning that activities that serve to 
instantiate the virtues in people can be morally laudable paths by which individuals can achieve 
flourishing. The military life, with the virtues that it requires and fosters is one such path to 
flourishing. It therefore serves to understand precisely how military command and soldiering serve to 
develop the virtues. Further, Aquinas construes the virtues as being habits that direct an individual 
toward his or her ultimate end – happiness (I-II q. 1 a. 8).  
Importantly, Aquinas notes that ‘no man can serve two masters,’ and that ‘[i]t is impossible 
for one man's will to be directed at the same time to diverse things, as last ends’ (I-II q. 1 a. 5). What 
this suggests is that man’s ultimate end, happiness, is the only thing to which humans ultimately aim, 
and is common amongst all men. For Aquinas, and Augustine too, this end is happiness which 
ultimately consists in God (I-II q. 2 a. 8). This is significant for the reason that the conception of the 
virtues that Aquinas presents is one in which all virtuous behaviour is all directed toward one end. 
Thus, if virtuous conduct is to warrant the name, it must be conduct that directs a person toward 
happiness.7 This point is one that will be picked up again later in the paper.  
 
1.1.1: Aquinas on Prudence and Courage 
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Aquinas’ treatment of war at various points in the Summa reflects that, as Gregory Reichberg (2010: 
263) notes, ‘his aim was to […] situate lethal force in relation to the virtues that render it an acceptable 
practice in human life, and inversely, to indicate what vices are especially to be avoided.’ By bringing 
the practice of war under the realm of the virtues, Aquinas subjects those who fight in wars not only 
to juridical norms, but to matters of internal morality; that is, questions of virtue and vice. Whilst 
virtuous commanders and soldiers will require a complete set of the virtues working co-operatively, 
Aquinas sees these practices as being specially disposed to particular virtues, those being, as was said 
above, prudence and courage, which Reichberg (2010: 264) describes as ‘two dispositions assuring 
right conduct in bello.’ 
Prudence, for Aquinas, is the special virtue of the cognitive faculty which allows man to decide 
between various paths of action (II-II q. 47 a. 1). Aquinas goes on to suggest that prudence does not 
apply only to the individual, but has political relevance too (II-II q. 47 a. 10). This includes a specific 
type of prudence directed to military judgements, which differs from political prudence in that each is 
directed to a different range of acts: those concerned with the right ordering of the state on the one 
hand, and those concerned with effective resistance against external attacks on the other.  
 
[I]n those things also which are in accordance with reason, there should be not only 
"political" prudence, which disposes in a suitable manner such things as belong to the 
common good, but also a "military" prudence, whereby hostile attacks are repelled (II-II q. 50 a. 4). 
 
This is important because the introduction of prudence into moral reasoning about war is new to 
JWT. Aquinas notes that prudential reasoning is not only inherent in the practice of warfare, but that 
participating in warfare can be—as a response to virtue—a constitutive aspect of the moral life 
generally; not just insofar as one fights for justice, but also insofar as one is good at fighting. Aquinas 
does not, however, suggest that prudence is the virtue which governs all military conduct; ordinary 
soldiers do not need military prudence to function well in their role. Aquinas explains the distinction 
between the soldier and the commander as one of virtue: issuing a command and bringing that 
command to fruition are very different things. ‘The execution of military service belongs to fortitude, 
but the direction, especially in so far as it concerns the commander-in-chief, belongs to prudence’ (II-II 
q. 50 a. 4).  
So, although the prudent man is best equipped for military command, it is the courageous man 
who is best suited for soldiering. Fortitude (or courage) is the virtue which allows man to pursue 
what he knows to be good despite the difficulties involved (Aquinas 1948, II-II q. 123 a. 1). In the 
context of the military life, fortitude usually comes in the form of doing what is right despite the 
prospect of dying in the process and, because death is perhaps the greatest physical evil one can suffer, 
courage in the face of death ranks as one of the purest instantiations of the virtue.   
 
[F]ortitude of soul must be that which binds the will firmly to the good of reason in face of the 
greatest evils: because he that stands firm against great things, will in consequence stand firm 
against less things, but not conversely. Moreover it belongs to the notion of virtue that it should 
regard something extreme: and the most fearful of all bodily evils is death, since it does away all 
bodily goods (II-II q. 123 a. 4) 
 
The warrior faces, almost uniquely, the opportunity to practice fortitude in his endeavours, because 
although ‘the dangers of death arising out of sickness, storms at sea, attacks from robbers, and the 
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like, do not seem to come on a man through his pursuing some good [...] the dangers of death which 
occur in battle come to man directly on account of some good, because, to wit, he is defending the 
common good by a just fight’ (II-II q. 123 a. 5). 
Again, Aquinas demonstrates how the act of soldiering can be a constitutive element of the 
good life. The soldier can fight justly and laudably. However, to do so he must take some interest in 
matters of jus ad bellum. Fortitude, as we have seem, is the moderation of fear of death in order to 
achieve goods which require risk. Fortitude requires a conception of the good aimed for; a cognitive 
assent that the end desired justifies the risk undertaken. This seems to imply that the courageous 
soldier will have considered, and become confident in, the justice of the cause for which he fights. 
Aquinas notes that ‘it belongs to the virtue of fortitude to remove any obstacle that withdraws 
the will from following the reason’ (II-II q. 123 a. 3) it follows then that if reason is not employed, the 
subsequent act cannot be fortitudinous. This arguably places a 'burden of contemplation' on the 
soldier without which his act may not be unjust, but cannot be virtuous. It falls to the virtuous soldier 
to contemplate the justice of his cause before being willing to risk his life in its pursuit. 
So in light of this, how would Augustine and Aquinas describe the virtuous soldier? First and 
foremost, the virtuous soldier will be a virtuous person. He or she will be a person who habitually and 
wilfully chooses actions that promote the good in a particular situation. For both, the virtuous soldier 
will be one who fears doing evil more than he fears dying and will courageously pursue the good 
even in the face of severe physical risk. More than this, however, he will by the type of person who 
willingly chooses to do what is right without any external motivation to do so: he will be the type of 
person who chooses to do what is virtuous for its own sake. This is advantageous from a moral 
perspective because individuals who feel personally disposed toward acting well will more easily 
comply with in bello moral and legal restrictions.  Furthermore, as I discussed above, the virtues are 
habits to act rightfully which direct a person toward happiness. Thus, the virtuous soldier or commander 
will be one whose soldiering or commanding directs him toward happiness. Thus, for virtuous 
military personnel, involvement in military life becomes an active contributor to their moral and 
psychological wellbeing. Here emerge two separate arguments in favour of incorporating aretaic 
thinking into JWT: first, because personal virtue amongst military personnel is likely to lead to 
improved conformance with moral and legal regulation on in bello conduct; and secondly, because 
virtue, properly conceived, allows military personnel to reconcile their involvement in war with their 
living a morally praiseworthy and personally satisfying life. 
 
1.1.2: Virtue and Fragmentation 
 
The latter point regarding the interaction of virtue and living a happy life is especially important and 
speaks to a growing problem for military personnel today by which the competing roles identities 
inhabited by military personnel – broadly, their civilian and military identities – conflict with one 
another in ways that inhibit the personal flourishing of individuals. This problem is described by Paul 
Berghaus and Nathan Cartagena (2013: 287) as ‘fragmentation.’ 
 
As social creatures, human beings possess a number of identities [...] Many people struggle to see 
themselves as a unified person, because they believe that each identity requires them to be a 
distinctly different person. Throughout a given day, they transition from being one person to 
another as they move to each new social context. 
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Fragmentation can be deleterious to the happiness or flourishing of military personnel when the 
different identities they inhabit seem to conflict with one another. Whilst fragmentation is not a 
problem that is limited to military personnel, they do seem especially vulnerable to it for at least two 
reasons. First, because the difference between the military and civilian life is particularly sharp by 
comparison to, for instance, the difference between a teacher’s professional and private life, thus 
making the transition particularly difficult, as Nancy Sherman (2010: 115) notes in discussing the case 
of William Quinn, an interrogator: 
 
“Border passing” – that is, moving between civilian roles and the roles required in uniform and 
in war – is neither morally nor psychologically simple. The passage can subject both 
psychologically strong and morally good persons to feelings of shame and remorse, as well as to 
traumatic symptoms. In Quinn’s case, deception and betrayal, manipulation and exploitation, 
tools morally questionable in ordinary transactions, had become standard tools of his specialized 
trade. And this did not sit perfectly well. 
 
Second, military personnel are especially vulnerable to fragmentation because ‘it is often the case that 
they identify predominantly with their professional moral self’ (Berghaus & Cartagena 2013, 289). 
Thus, instead of seeing him or herself as, for example, both a parent and a soldier, the soldiering 
identity may be seen to take priority over one’s civilian identities. At worst, this threatens to rupture 
the individual from his or her identity as a parent; at best, the two identities pull in different 
directions. Recalling that Aquinas saw happiness as a univocal end of human behaviour toward 
which all virtuous activity is ultimately directed, we see how fragmentation – which pulls a person in 
different directions by dividing them into separate, and sometimes contradictory identities – 
undermines the project of seeking the achievement of a single ultimate end for one’s activities.  
The virtuous soldier will therefore be one who understands that his or her deeds help form 
one’s identity, and therefore he or she needs to integrate the military identity with various others in a 
harmonious manner. Soldiering is a way of life that can either assist in the achievement of human 
flourishing or be detrimental to it, but it is not separate from the rest of life; the way I soldier will 
affect the way I act when I am at home. One area in which this is particularly telling is in the 
experience of ‘moral injury’ amongst returned soldiers. By moral injury, I refer to what Johnathan 
Shay (2012: 58) describes as ‘the soul wound inflicted by doing something that violates one’s own 
ethics, ideals, or attachments.’ Berghaus & Cartagena (2013) tell the story of Corporal Sanchez, a man 
who discovered that he had accidentally killed a fourteen year old boy in the line of duty. His 
ruminations are telling: ‘[t]he Army says I did the right thing, so why do I feel so guilty? How can I 
say I am a good soldier and a good man when I killed an innocent boy?’ 
Were Sanchez a parent, he might also wonder how he could be a good parent whilst 
simultaneously being a soldier who had killed a child. Here, civilian and military identities threaten 
to schism a character unless the two identities can be harmonised under a broader framework. The 
virtues, understood holistically as character traits by which a person willingly acts virtuously for the 
sake of being virtuous, and in a way that advances a person’s path to happiness. Further, he could 
consider whether the process which had lead to his killing the children had been undertaken 
prudently, courageously, and from a genuine desire to do good. If it had, Sanchez might in time be 
able to recognise that although the outcomes of his action were bad, that he had conducted himself 
with virtue. Thus, his actions would not reflect badly on his moral identity; indeed, his soldiering – 
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even despite killing a child – might still be reconcilable with living a happy life. As Berghaus and 
Cartagena (2013: 297) argue: 
 
Sanchez can think about his emotions in terms of his virtue-relevant goals. He can broaden the 
scope of his goal to be a just person such that it incorporates the other identities he possesses [...] 
From a more realistic vantage point [...] Sanchez will be able to begin to process anew his actions 
in Baghdad, their consequences, his feelings about them, and their ramifications for his 
development as a person. 
 
However, this response appears to be available only if one employs a certain conception of the virtues 
and their interaction with happiness. Absent a coherent approach to aretaic ethics such as that 
provided by Augustine and more substantially by Aquinas, JWT will be unlikely to offer such a 
coherent and satisfying response, as we will see in the following section. 
 
 
1.2: Modern JWT 
 
When JWT enjoyed a strong revival in the 20th century, its greatest spokesperson was Michael 
Walzer. In his seminal book Just and Unjust Wars, Walzer (1977: xxiii-xxiv) explicitly founds his just 
war theory on the concept of human rights. 
 
There is a particular arrangement, a particular view of the moral world, that seems to me the best 
one. I want to suggest that the arguments we make about war are most fully understood (though 
other understandings are possible) as efforts to recognize and respect the rights of individuals and 
associated men and women. The morality I shall expound is in its philosophical form a doctrine of 
human rights. 
 
Walzer was not alone in this regard;8 the trend began earlier in response to the Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights: ‘now theorists saw that the new moral basis for the age was destined to be human 
rights, and so they got to work interpreting traditional just war theory in light of human rights’ 
(Orend 2007: 23). 
Indeed, the language of rights has permeated modern JWT. Jeff McMahan, another prominent just 
war theorist whose theory sits at odds with that of Walzer’s also formulates his theory in the 
language of human rights. McMahan (2009: 16) objects to the moral equality of combatants on the 
basis that just combatants and unjust combatants enjoy different moral status; whilst just combatants 
have done nothing to forfeit their right not to be killed, unjust combatants have. McMahan (2009: 106-
107) similarly explains the shift away from virtue and natural law approaches and toward human-
rights based approaches in terms of an interest in developing a 'Law of Armed Conflict' (LOAC) 
rather than a simple morality of war.  
 
There are also historical reasons why people tend to conflate the morality and law of war. The 
moral theory of the just war antedated any serious legal regulation of war. When juridical thinkers 
began to develop accounts of the "law of nations," the framework within which they formulated 
their theories and proposals was inevitably provided by the prevailing understanding of natural 
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law found in classical versions of just war theory. Legal principles were thus couched in just war 
idioms. […]  
 
As the legal regulation of war became more effective, particularly in the eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries, the practical significance of just war theory was gradually eclipsed by that of the 
evolving law of war […] Late twentieth-century just war doctrine was thus modeled quite closely 
on the international law of war in the form that the latter took at that time. 
 
However, that none of these rights-based approaches is entirely adequate can be seen from the way in 
which virtue and character-based concepts infiltrate their thinking in ways that do not map clearly on 
to a rights-based JWT. For instance, when Walzer (2004: 170 argues that ‘when it is our action that 
puts innocent people at risk, even if the action is justified, we are bound to do what we can to reduce 
those risks, even if this involves risks to our own soldiers,’ he makes the argument partly on the basis 
of civilian rights to immunity, but also partly with reference to Albert Camus' argument that one 
cannot kill unless one is willing to die. Camus’ argument could hardly be formulated as saying ’only 
when one is willing to die does one earn the right to kill another’; rather, what Camus (and, via 
citation, Walzer) is saying is that there are particular attributes of moral character and a particular 
psychological state requisite for an agent's killing to be just. These are necessary, but not sufficient 
conditions for morally acceptable intentional killing.9 Implicit in Walzer's stance is an interest in 
character and moral psychology that a purely rights-based approach cannot justify.  
Consider another example, this time from Orend (2007: 111) in his discussion of torture in The 
Morality of War.  
 
[At Abu Ghraib] the world saw some shocking photos of American troop conduct […] Some of it - 
like deliberate, prolonged sleep deprivation, and using dogs to attack or threaten already prone 
and naked people - clearly violated the Geneva Conventions. Others might have been visually 
disturbing but do not obviously count as human rights violations, such as forcing the prisoners to 
wear dog collars, or having American women ridicule their private parts, or putting female 
panties on their faces temporarily. 
 
Orend (2007: 111) disapproves both types of actions as ‘a violation of both the letter and the spirit of 
the principle of benevolent quarantine,’ but is not willing to completely condemn the latter: ‘I 
suppose we might condone efforts at psychological pressure […] when the goal is getting information 
which might save innocent lives.’ It seems like Orend (2007: 112) wants to condemn the undignifying 
behaviour of US troops, but lacks the theoretical framework to do so; he notes that ‘[t]orture hardens 
the heart and corrupts the character of the torturer.’ This is problematic for two reasons: first, because 
Orend is unwilling to forbid absolutely behaviour that corrupts the character of an otherwise good 
individual – and is likely to undermine the individual’s ability to live a happy or fulfilling life; and 
secondly, because moral corruption may not be exclusive to the torturer; the antagonistic interrogator, 
willing to mock, insult, lie and threaten surely cannot expect to leave with a pristine character. Thus, 
even licit activities threaten to form a professional identity based, at least in part, on moral vices. 
Again, Nancy Sherman (2010: 117) is informative:  
 
The nearly exclusive focus on torture has silenced a more general debate about the moral 
shadowland in which the interrogator dwells, even when he does not practice torture […] [T]he 
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space the interrogator inhabits has its own special moral demands. And with it comes a distinct set 
of moral and psychological vulnerabilities. 
 
What Sherman is aware of – and which Orend is arguably less sensitive to – is the fact that even 
‘interrogation-short-of-torture’ (Sherman uses the term ’exploitation’) brings accompanying moral 
difficulties for the interrogator. The subject’s vulnerability, loyalty and trust is exploited by the 
interrogator for specific ends; and the skills requisite to do so are not compatible with the overall 
flourishing of a life. In cases such as this, although the soldier has not breached the Law of Armed 
Conflict, in no way does is the case is closed, morally speaking.  
Here the fragmentation problem re-emerges. Orend’s unwillingness to fully prohibit torture 
on the sole basis of its capacity for corruption reflects a sense amongst a number of contemporary just 
war theorists that the deeds soldiers perform are at best a ‘necessary evil.’ However, a necessary evil 
is still an evil, and it may not be possible to reconcile one’s identity as evil-doer with the endeavour to 
live a morally excellent life with some chance of happiness. Here we return to the case of Corporal 
Sanchez: Sanchez was told by the Army that he had acted rightly but yet Sanchez himself believed his 
actions to be morally unjustifiable. Berghaus and Cartagena (2013: 291) explain that ‘[a] subsequent 
routine investigation of the incident found that [...] Corporal Sanchez acted appropriately within the 
line of duty and rules of engagement.’ The investigation did not, it seems, take the further step 
mentioned in the previous section of assuring Sanchez that he had acted courageously or virtuously, 
and thus allowing him to reconcile his conduct with his moral self more generally conceived. What 
the investigation had determined was that Sanchez had not intentionally violated any of his 
professional duties.  
This reflects the modern conception of virtue that permeates both JWT and the military 
establishment generally. The virtuous soldier, under this approach, is more limited in the sense that 
his virtues are restricted to his role as a soldier. He has character traits that mean that he habitually 
adheres to the laws of armed combat and his character is compatible with the requirements of 
soldiering to uphold human rights. However, the virtues are defined by what the military profession 
defines as excellent conduct, rather than being defined by those activities which best lead to 
happiness. Thus, the military profession, were to adopt the language of virtue without adopting the 
full aretaic spirit present in Aquinas and Augustine, risks the development of military personnel 
whose professions pull them away from living a flourishing life. Paul Robinson (2006: 3) notes that 
the virtues seen as complicit with military excellence tend to be created by societies, but may also lead 
soldiers away from right conduct. 
 
The four virtues of prowess, courage, loyalty, and truthfulness form the unchanging core of 
military honour [...] Many societies create formal codes of behaviour which prescribe how to 
display the approved virtues. Unfortunately, in yet another complication, this means that honour 
can derive from rigid obedience of the code even when it is unhelpful or even clearly wrong. 
 
There are two significant observations from Robinson. The first is that there is no mention of 
prudence, autonomy or conscience amongst the important character traits of the honourable soldier, 
meaning that the soldier’s role as a free-thinking, autonomous agent (as he is in his life outside the 
military) is undermined. Under such an approach, the virtuous soldier is paradoxically required to 
separate himself from fundamental human characteristics. The flaw in this approach is noted by 
Susan Martinelli-Fernandez (2006: 57), who argues that a Kantian approach to moral education might 
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be beneficial in the military: ‘[t]he goal of moral education [...] is not merely to get the agent to follow 
rules. It is the cultivation of moral agency, an agency that involves one’s becoming an independent, 
right thinking and right acting person.’  
The second is that formulations of good conduct which associate rule-adherence and loyalty 
with virtue are entirely dependent on the rules themselves being morally good ones that can be easily 
applied across all situations and boundaries. If this is not the case – and given the contingencies of 
war it is likely not to be – then defining morally good conduct only in association with obeying 
particular rules or fulfilling particular duties is setting soldiers up for moral failure. Thus, it seems 
that equipping the soldier with skills or character traits that will allow him or her to adapt morally to 
the demands of particular situations requires a more comprehensive understanding of ethics than a 
strictly deontological formulation is able to provide. Here we again see an area in which aretaic 
modes of thinking will be welcome. However, incorporating the virtues into military training may 
not be sufficient to overcome the difficulties that appear to arise in the face of deontological ethics. 
Some have taken a step toward aretaic thinking by aiming to instil professional virtues is problematic 
for the same reason: professional virtues, if they are divorced from a more holistic account of the good 
life (such as that present in Aquinas’ writing), threaten to require a professional to perform actions 
that he or she cannot reconcile with his or her identity, conceived more broadly. As Berghaus & 
Cartagena (2013: 293) note, ‘[b]y limiting moral aspiration to a context-specific good, professionalism, 
[professional virtue approaches] actually further the problem of fragmentation.’  
 
2: Virtue and Military Ethics Education 
 
If there was any uncertainty as to whether the division between old and new concepts of virtue in 
JWT had carried over to MEE, Paul Robinson’s (2008; 1) observation in the introduction to the 
collected volume Ethics Education in the Military ends it:  
 
... for some ethics is synonymous with ‘morality’. The aim of ethics education, therefore, is seen as 
being what many refer to as ‘character development’, in other words the creation of morally 
upright persons through the instillation of certain key qualities or dispositions of character 
(commonly known as virtues). Others, however, disagree, and consider ethics to be somewhat 
distinct from general morality. Instead, ethics are more properly seen as being related to a given 
profession and its requirements. The focus of ethics education therefore shifts from character 
development to creating an understanding of the purpose and methods of the profession and the 
values which underpin it. 
 
These two contrasting approaches suggest different approaches to military ethics: the latter limiting it 
to a set of clearly defined and codified rules, where adherence to the rules counts as ethical conduct; 
whilst the former takes a more holistic approach, apparently believing that moral conduct in the 
military is synonymous with ‘what the virtuous soldier would do,’ where it is assumed that a 
virtuous person will also be a virtuous soldier. Although both these approaches are commonly seen 
in ethics education, it is clear that one is waxing and the other waning. As Robinson notes, ‘the 
predominant principle which most military ethics education programmes have adopted is that of 
virtue ethics.’ (2008: 5) This may not, in fact, be true: although many military programs have adopted 
the language of virtue ethics, it is not clear that they have adopted it in its full spirit, including 
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providing avenues for military personnel to actually develop the virtues that are so central to their 
practice and, as Berghaus & Cartagena (2013: 295) note (echoing Martinelli-Fernandez’s thoughts 
above), ‘a central concept of virtue theory is that human beings must reflect upon who they are and 
what they ought to be.’ Such reflection can only, I argue, take place in the context of a holistic model 
of virtue ethics. It cannot be successful if limited to a model of professional virtues. This is 
problematic because, as Berghaus and Cartagena (2013: 293) critically observe is the case in the US 
Army, ‘the scope of moral development within the Army Profession campaign is limited to a soldier’s 
professional moral development.’ As long as professional virtue is the lens through which military 
ethics educators view moral development, the extent to which MEE truly reflects and can make use of 
virtue ethics will be stunted. 
Further problems emerge when the concept of ‘professionalism’ is embraced without being 
contextualised by reference to the moral life conceived more broadly. Don Carrick (2008: 197) 
expresses scepticism toward the practical viability of a virtue ethics approach to military ethics 
serving as an appropriate normative guide for soldiers.  
 
If the educators want to bring virtue ethics, care ethics and so on in to the pedagogic equation, 
then they run a serious risk of taking the soldier outside his role and into situations where he 
does no longer have a reliable moral compass to guide him; he can find himself having to deal 
with people ‘simply’ on the basis of common humanity, fellow-feeling and a universal morality. 
 
Carrick’s fear is that relying on universal, ‘everyday morality’ to govern warfare will generate a kind 
of ‘moral schizophrenia’ because soldiering involves deeds that defy everyday morality, such as 
intentional killing (Carrick 2008, 195-196). As such, it is preferable to educate soldiers so that they see 
the practice of soldiering as a separate moral realm from that of everyday life. As such, Carrick (2008: 
196) advocates ‘ring-fencing soldiering within the notion of professional role morality.’ 
Carrick expresses a genuine concern regarding profession-centric approaches to virtue: that, 
as Berghaus and Cartagena (2013: 293) note, focussing only ‘on the development of character traits 
within the professional domain of soldiers’ lives […] fails to help soldiers develop in a holistic 
manner,’ and may, in fact, ‘further the problem of fragmentation.’ The moral seriousness of 
soldiering, which involves committing ‘the ultimate wrong’ (Carrick 2008: 195) – killing, demands 
substantial psychological protection for soldiers who are asked to kill. To avoid the kind of slippage, 
one must insulate what a soldier does from the rest of his moral life by referencing his professional 
role; that is, embracing a kind of role morality. This is an unusual conclusion to reach if one considers 
arguments, such as that of Sherman (2010: 115), that moral schizophrenia is unavoidable for the 
modern soldier in large part due to the huge gulf between ‘peacetime’ and ‘wartime’ morality.  
 
“Border passing” – that is, moving between civilian roles and the roles required in uniform and in 
war – is neither morally nor psychologically simple. The passage can subject both psychologically 
strong and morally good persons to feelings of shame and remorse, as well as to traumatic 
symptoms. In Quinn’s [an interrogator Sherman is interviewing] case, deception and betrayal, 
manipulation and exploitation, tools morally questionable in ordinary transactions, had become 
standard tools of his specialized trade. And this did not sit perfectly well. 
 
Carrick’s suggestion is that if soldiers are only informed by ‘everyday morality,’ and have to ‘deal 
with people “simply” on the basis of common humanity, fellow-feeling and a universal morality,’ 
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they will be less able to make decisions vital to the successful fulfilment of their role as soldiers. 
Sherman, realising that what a person does actually affects the type of person he is, highlights the 
reverse: if soldiers are encouraged to think of soldiering as entirely separate from other walks of life, 
there will be inevitable seepage where aspects of their soldiering are habituated, or haunt them in the 
form of guilt in so small part because of the stark difference between the now-separate moral realms 
of civilian and soldier life.  
It is worth asking on what basis Carrick justifies his claim that if soldiers were to make 
decisions solely on the basis of a common morality that they would be unable to perform their roles 
as soldiers well. The argument is as follows:  
 
My concerns can [be] encapsulated in a simple imperative; one fundamental objective of any ethics 
education programme must be to protect the soldier against the sort of moral schizophrenia that 
can affect anyone who is brought up on a diet of unqualified moral rules (do not lie, Do not break 
other people’s things, Do not harm, Do not kill) but who is then told that he is entirely justified in 
going out and doing the exact opposite, namely undertaking as much breaking, harming and 
killing as possible (Carrick 2008: 197). 
 
Besides taking issue with the straw-man claim that soldiers are told to break, harm and kill “as much 
as possible”, we should question why it is the case that developing two distinct sets of rules for two 
distinct contexts is the ideal way to protect against moral schizophrenia – particularly when 
Sherman’s empirical research, as well as the more recent work of Berghaus & Catagena, suggests 
otherwise. Might it not be more fruitful to explain to soldiers that, as the classical just war theorists 
believed, what is morally important is to act virtuously in war – with charity, courage, prudence, 
loyalty, etc... and thus to foster virtues that are equally welcome in home life and war time? This is 
why Aquinas chooses to situate his discussion of war within a discussion of the virtues rather than 
within discussions of justice (Reichberg 2011), because he believes that ethical conduct in war requires 
the same character traits and does ethical conduct in other walks of life, and that the virtues of 
soldiering must be directed toward happiness in the same way as other virtues. The model proposed 
by Berghaus and Cartagena (2013; 297), which helps soldiers to ‘develop character traits in the 
professional and personal domains of their moral selves. It also encourages soldiers to acquire goods 
that are external to the Army profession but are relevant for members of that profession’ appears 
much better suited to protecting against moral schizophrenia (viz. fragmentation) than does a role 
morality approach. 
That military ethics should be considered a branch of professional ethics (but not necessarily 
a role morality) has also been argued in a very different way by Martin Cook and Henrik Syse (2010: 
119), who argue that ‘[f]irstly and most importantly, military ethics is a species of the genus 
‘professional ethics’. That is to say, it exists to be of service to professionals who are not themselves 
specialists in ethics but who have to carry out the tasks entrusted to the profession as honorably and 
correctly as possible.’ However, Syse and Cook’s standard of professional ethics is different from 
Carrick’s: ‘The test is fairly simple here: is what’s going on [...] the sort of thing that might be helpful 
in providing real-world guidance for policy-makers, military commanders and leaders, or operational 
decision-making?’ (2010: 120). 
In fact, Cook and Syse at no point suggest that military ethics is reducible to a set of laws, that 
right conduct in warfare consists only in rule adherence or that soldiers’ morality is different from 
that of the everyday. What they note is simply that military ethics is first and foremost about training 
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ethical practitioners of warfare; any academic endeavour that is not directed to this end ‘are more 
marginal, ancillary, or perhaps essentially irrelevant’ (Cook & Syse 2010: 120). In fact, they speak 
somewhat disparagingly of military lawyers rehearsing the LOAC to fulfil their annual training 
requirements, suggesting that ethical training involves much more than rote-learning the rules (Cook 
& Syse 2010: 119). What it requires, I want to suggest, is (a) the development of virtuous habits within 
those who will find themselves a part of the theatre of war, and (b) that the normative theory by 
which we evaluate actions conducted in war, JWT, hold a special, central place for virtue so that 
soldiers, politicians, officers and educators alike recognise that questions of virtue, character and 
moral psychology are not peripheral issues to military ethics, but sit at the heart of the field. 
Ethics educators have increasingly seen the importance of fostering virtuous soldiers as a 
means to ensuring that wars are fought ethically. Here ethics is not necessarily understood simply as 
rule-adherence, as Alexander Mosely (2008: 184-185) notes: ‘to raise the individual soldier up from an 
uncritical level to the philosophical realm [...] can lead to a rejection, at any time, of the armed forces 
demands, commands, and even contract.’ Ethics teachers have become aware that the project of 
ensuring that a soldier does what is right in a situation is greatly assisted by ensuring that soldier is, 
at his heart, a good person. This allows us to recognise the end of MEE, but what remains to be seen is 
what form it should take in order to achieve this goal. 
 
3: Liberal Arts and Military Education 
 
I believe the traditional liberal arts approach to education can support MEE in achieving the ends 
established above. The understanding of liberal arts I will be applying here is that which originated in 
the Catholic University tradition, explained by Jeffry Davis (2007: 65) as ‘interdisciplinary thinking 
guided by the great questions of the human condition: “Who am I?” and “How should I live?”’ 
Warren A. Nord (2007: 31) lends this understanding more depth, describing the liberal arts as follows: 
 
It assumes that moral truths and the ideals of civic virtue are to be found in classical literature, 
and it is largely a literary education. It founds character, and is meant to be the ideal education 
for public leaders […] A liberal arts education binds students to the past, to tradition. 
 
In short, the liberal arts education aims not just to teach students how to excel at whatever vocation 
they may have chosen, but how to excel as citizens and as moral persons whilst simultaneously (and 
indeed as part of that moral development) connecting them to the cultural, historical, and 
philosophical traditions that individuals are born into. This section will focus on four aspects of 
liberal arts education, so understood – interdisciplinarity, tradition, the development of intellectual 
curiosity, and the focus on morality as being concerned with the overall goodness of a life - and 
examine how they might contribute to the goals of MEE defined by Carrick: protecting against the 
psychological scars of battle.  
The appeal of the liberal arts as an interdisciplinary approach to education, whereby students 
become familiar with a host of different areas of study (history, philosophy, psychology, science, 
sociology, politics, etc.) is that it provides students with applicable knowledge in a variety of different 
situations. Because of this, it is impossible to list all the possible benefits of interdisciplinarity to 
someone in a military context. However, I will suggest one here: most important, I believe, is some 
formal training in psychology.10 I have repeatedly cited instances where current trends in JWT 
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underemphasise the psychological trials of soldiers at war, and the hardships they face. One way in 
which the military establishment could assist soldiers is by talking in advance about emotions they 
are likely to experience: guilt, regret, shame, anger, hate, vengeance, and giving them an opportunity 
to understand them as moral and psychological phenomena In her classic work, The Fragility of 
Goodness, Martha Nussbaum (2001: xviii) assesses in depth the substantial role that luck and the 
emotions play in the Ancient Greek moral tradition. When talking about the work’s modern-day 
relevance, she suggests that:  
 
Thinking well about what emotions are can help us defend better the general thesis of Fragility 
about their cognitive role. In the process, it reveals both some risks we run by trusting to their 
guidance and some previously unacknowledged prospects for personal and social progress. 
 
This is the role that psychological training in the military could play: awareness of the significant role 
of emotions in the moral lives of soldiers, and also a way of cautioning soldiers against valuing the 
emotions too strongly. Here I emphasise how the transferral of knowledge – an intellectual virtue – 
has moral repercussions, and may indeed make the practice of moral virtue easier. For instance, 
educating soldiers about, the psychology of combat, can lead to soldiers to a more sophisticated 
understanding of the moral virtue of courage. Clark C. Barrett (2011: 100) explains how in combat 
situations, the amygdala takes control of the brain and ‘complex motor skills diminish. Tunnel vision, 
loss of depth perception, and restricted hearing follow. Loss of bowel and bladder control is 
inevitable.’ Going further, Barrett observes how ‘In pop culture, there is a connection between 
cowardice and losing bowel or bladder control; but of course, there is no such real connection in 
combat.’ Thus, soldiers who are educated in the psychology of combat can challenge pop culture 
assumptions about what it means to be courageous or cowardly, which in turn influences soldiers’ 
attitudes toward both their own conduct as well as the conduct of their comrades.  
Another benefit of the interdisciplinary approach of the liberal arts is that its classical interest 
provides a wealth of rich, sophisticated examples of moral and immoral conduct within warfare to 
assess. This provides not only a subject for philosophical analysis and inquiry, but also inspiration on 
an emotional level, as Cook and Syse (2010: 121) suggest (with caution) that: 
 
[T]here is some role for the hortatory in professional military ethics. Perhaps especially in a 
profession which requires courage and spirit (what the Greeks called thumos), non-rational 
appeals that motivate have a role in encouraging those very attitudes and behaviors. Tales and 
examples of exemplary individuals and actions can provide us with role-models and motivation at 
a level deeper than rational analysis. But they also need to be used with caution - they can easily 
misfire and produce cynicism. And of course selecting the appropriate examples and heroes 
presupposes an antecedent grasp of excellence in military conduct and virtue. 
 
The success of non-rational appeals as a means of compelling soldiers to act well is well-documented. 
By taking particular behaviours or character traits and making them synonymous with the identity of 
particular practice or profession (such as soldiering), professionals come to define themselves by 
those values. Shannon E. French (2003: 14) argues that the warrior code, which is internally developed 
and regulated by other warriors, is a key influence in eliciting good conduct from soldiers. In this 
vein, the liberal arts educations insistence on tradition makes it an excellent candidate for helping to 
develop a healthy, effective warrior code for soldiers to defer to. French (2003: 14) refers to the 
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tradition of the ‘Long Gray Line’ at West Point Military Academy, suggesting that ‘the reverence 
modern warriors feel for their illustrious predecessors almost resembles the ancestor worship that is 
found in so many of the world’s older religions. Warriors are proud to receive the legacies of the past 
and wish to remain worthy of them.’ The appeal of the liberal arts insistence on tradition is consistent 
with MEE’s interest in virtue ethics models of education: as Nafsika Athanassoulis (2014) explains, 
‘Moral development, at least in its early stages, relies on the availability of good role models. The 
virtuous agent acts as a role model and the student of virtue emulates his or her example.’ The liberal 
arts provide students with a host of role models on which to model their own virtuous conduct.  
However, students ought to be able to discerningly consider whether all figures from within 
the military tradition should be esteemed as role models. Achilles is an archetypal warrior, but should 
he be considered a virtuous warrior? Answering questions such as these demonstrates the third 
benefit of the liberal arts: the development of a spirit of questioning and critical thinking. Recalling 
first McMahan’s (2009: Ch. III) view of a soldier’s personal responsibility for the immorality of the 
cause he fights for, a soldier’s ability to think critically about ethics and justice is vital to their ability 
to perform their role ethically. Again, Cook & Syse (2010: 120) note that ‘critical assessment of LOAC 
is a fundamental component of military ethics, understood as professional ethics’ and as Mosely 
noted above, the free and fully functioning soldier should be able to disobey a command at any time, 
but to be able to do so requires that soldiers possess the ability to think critically and analyse concepts 
well. Secondly, thinking critically and reasoning about how one ought to live one’s life falls under the 
domain of the virtue prudence, which Aquinas emphasised as the central virtue of the military 
commander. Insofar as the liberal arts are able to instil critical analysis skills in its graduates, it will be 
preparing them to excel in their role as military commanders under the classical model of JWT.  
Finally, and to my mind most importantly, the liberal arts encourage students to think about 
morality as a system that evaluates the overall goodness of a life, and each act as contributing to or 
detracting from that goodness. In this sense, it is profoundly Aristotelian. However, it also serves to 
support a view of soldiering as connected to the other aspects of one’s moral life; what I do as a 
soldier is not separate from the rest of my identity. In the British Military, David Rodin advised 
educators to encourage their students to achieve a Rawlsian ‘reflective equilibrium’ (Mileham 2008: 
51) that is, to ‘“test” various parts of our system of beliefs against the other beliefs we hold, looking 
for ways in which some of these beliefs support others, seeking coherence among the widest set of 
beliefs, and revising and refining them at all levels when challenges to some arise from others’ 
(Daniels 2011). Such an approach encourages students to think about the obligations the military 
holds them to and evaluate their consistency with other moral values the students hold. This, rather 
than the development of a ‘role morality’ appears to me to be the ideal way to genuinely protect 
students from moral schizophrenia. 
Of course, the typical graduate coming out of liberal arts colleges today is probably not going 
to be equipped with the knowledge or character traits necessary to perform well in a military context. 
I do not mean by the above that a standard liberal arts education is sufficient as military training, 
even on the level of developing virtues or critical thinking skills. These things must be tailored to be 
specifically relevant to a military context. This tailoring provokes an important question that I have 
not had time to address here: that being where an education process such as this should be housed? 
This important question is one that warrants further discussion. I do not have an answer here, but I 
would hazard that whatever the answer is, it would likely involve increasing the amount of time it 
takes to train soldiers and officers before they are ready for deployment.  
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Conclusion 
 
This paper has tried (perhaps over-ambitiously) to do several things. First it has aimed to show the 
historical differences between the classical founders JWT and the theory as it appears in the modern 
day. The difference largely concerns the role of virtue within the theory. I have argued against the 
modern conception of JWT as predominantly rights-centric on the basis that (a) it ignores the reality 
that soldiers need to be able to reconcile their deeds as soldiers with their moral lives generally, and 
(b) virtue-talk infiltrates these rights-based theories in ways which they seem unaware of. 
Furthermore, I have argued that the image of the virtuous soldier presented by the classical approach 
is the more convincing, not least because it comports better with new developments in MEE, which 
are beginning to consider the role of military ethics to extend beyond simple rule adherence.  
Finally, I have suggested some ways in which a modified liberal arts approach might support 
the goals of this new attitude to MEE and noted why the inconsistency between JWT and MEE should 
be disturbing to anyone interested in ensuring that war is practiced within the requirements of justice, 
and in ways that best furthers the flourishing of all involved, citing three reasons: environmental 
discrepancies, the devaluation of ethics generally, and the risk of moral schizophrenia. By way of 
closing I want to note (obviously) that I find these new trends in MEE to be particularly encouraging, 
and hold high hopes that some of the revived interest in virtue might gradually find its way into new 
discussions of JWT. 
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Notes 
1 Examples of JWT in the 20th & 21st century include Walzer (1977; 2004); Orend (2007); Elshtain (2003); 
Fotion (2007); McMahan (2009); and Reed & Ryall (2007). For an overview of the history of the theory, 
see: Johnson (1981) and Reichberg, Syse & Begby (2006). 
2 Examples of this approach include the works of Sherman (2005 & 2010); Robinson (2006); Rodin & 
Shue (2010); Davis (1992); French (2003); Gray (1970). 
3 The terms derive from the Greek terms deon, meaning duty, and arete, meaning virtue. 
4 So much was said in the opening line of the introduction to a special issue of the Journal of Military 
Ethics focussing on Virtue Ethics. See: Moelker & Olsthoorn (2007: 257): “It has frequently been argued 
in recent years that the best way to teach military ethics is by way of virtue ethics.” 
5 There is ongoing debate regarding whether the inclusion of war in discussions of charity indicates a 
"presumption against war" whereby the use of force is looked down on more strongly than some 
readers of Aquinas have suggested. For the affirmative case in this debate, see: McCarthy (2011). For 
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the counter-argument, see: Gorman (2010). I find Gorman's argument, which sides with James T. 
Johnson's, the more compelling and consistent with Thomas' writings. Manning's argument for the 
presumption against war makes claims which are unsustainable, for example, citing Todd Whitmore, 
Manning argues that Johnson's rejection of the presumption against war leads to permitting first-use 
of nuclear weapons, and argument which over-reaches almost to the point of non sequiter. 
6 The Doctrine of Double-Effect has been so widely discussed throughout moral philosophy and just 
war theory that I take it as clear that all understand what it entails; I do not here have time to outline it. 
In short, Aquinas argues in a discussion on whether all killing is murder, that one can, in attempting to 
prevent being killed by an aggressor, defend oneself - even lethally - from harm so long as one's intention 
is self-preservation, and any harm caused is a side-effect. See: Aquinas (II-II, Q.64, Art. 7) 
7 It does not matter for my purposes here whether or not happiness is connected to a God or not, only 
that it be seen as being, in some way, univocal.  
8 Although Brian Orend (2007: 24) suggests that "[i]t is in Walzer's book […] that the cementing of 
human rights theory within the core propositions of just war theory occurs.” 
9 The accompanying conditions would be those that rights-theorists have done well to point out: that 
the person being killed has somehow forfeited their right not to be killed by performing such-and-such 
an action. 
10 Another obvious candidate for a military-oriented liberal arts education is history; specifically, 
military history. I omit it from discussion here because it already forms an important part of officer 
training.  
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